According to @TO, Satoshi’s BTC is held across about 22,000 different private keys with no seed phrases or exposed public keys, and quantum computing will not break them, which he presents as a security assurance for long-term holders and traders (source: https://twitter.com/TO/status/1988382753340182907). Independent on-chain research by Sergio Demian Lerner estimates the Patoshi miner accumulated roughly 1.1 million BTC across tens of thousands of coinbase outputs in 2009–2010, consistent with a very large number of distinct keys that have remained dormant (source: https://bitslog.com/2019/04/17/the-return-of-the-dld-patoshi/). Early Bitcoin wallets did not use hierarchical deterministic seeds because BIP32 was standardized only in 2012, after Satoshi’s departure, implying non-deterministic keys rather than seed phrases (sources: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki, https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-guide#wallets-keys). However, not all early outputs hide public keys: many 2009 coinbase outputs used pay-to-public-key scripts that reveal public keys on-chain, whereas P2PKH hides the key until spending, which is relevant for any quantum-security assessment (source: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction#Standard_transaction_types). Current cryptographic research indicates breaking Bitcoin’s secp256k1 ECDSA would require large, fault-tolerant quantum computers far beyond today’s capabilities, so brute-force or quantum attacks are not a practical near-term threat for traders to price in (sources: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.06752, https://www.nist.gov/pqc). For trading strategy, the persistence of dormant Patoshi-pattern coins implies minimal immediate sell-pressure risk from these holdings, while any on-chain movement of such coinbase outputs would be a high-impact signal to monitor (source: https://bitslog.com/2019/04/17/the-return-of-the-dld-patoshi/).

According to Charles Edwards (@caprioleio), up to 20–30% of BTC held in legacy P2PK outputs could be taken by a future quantum computer within 2–8 years, and he proposes either allowing theft-related dumping or enforcing a migration window that burns unmigrated coins (source: Charles Edwards on X, Oct 15, 2025). According to Bitcoin Wiki, P2PK outputs reveal public keys on-chain, leaving any unspent P2PK UTXOs inherently exposed if Shor’s algorithm breaks secp256k1 ECDSA (source: Bitcoin Wiki, Pay-to-Pubkey). According to NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography program, no cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists today, though ECDSA is not quantum-safe and migration to standardized PQC schemes like CRYSTALS-Dilithium will be required once timelines warrant (source: NIST PQC status reports, 2022–2024). According to Roetteler et al. (Microsoft Research), breaking a single secp256k1 key demands very large fault-tolerant quantum resources beyond current hardware, making the specific 2–8 year horizon uncertain for traders to price (source: Roetteler et al., 2017, Quantum Resource Estimates for ECC).

According to Charles Edwards, Bitcoin faces a quantum-computing security risk that could enable spending of early Satoshi-era coins and trigger market selling, and he urges the community to act by 2026, source: Charles Edwards on X (Oct 13, 2025) and his linked YouTube video. Bitcoin transaction validation relies on ECDSA over secp256k1, which is theoretically vulnerable to sufficiently large fault-tolerant quantum computers via Shor’s algorithm, source: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide and P. W. Shor (1994). Many early outputs, including pay-to-public-key coinbase rewards used in 2009–2010, expose public keys on-chain and are therefore higher-risk if ECDSA is broken, source: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide and Bitcoin Wiki entry on Pay-to-PubKey. Independent on-chain research estimates roughly 1.1 million BTC attributed to early mining by Satoshi, underscoring potential market impact if such coins became movable, source: Sergio Demian Lerner’s Patoshi mining analysis. Governments have advanced post-quantum cryptography; NIST selected PQC algorithms and published draft standards for ML-DSA (Dilithium) and ML-KEM (Kyber) with guidance to begin migration planning, source: NIST PQC program announcements and migration guidance. Any Bitcoin move toward quantum-safe signatures would require protocol changes and broad coordination, making developer proposals and upgrade timelines important market catalysts for BTC, source: discussions on the bitcoin-dev mailing list and Bitcoin Core documentation.

According to @caprioleio, Satoshi’s early coins will be market dumped and quantum computing could break Bitcoin within 2-8 years, prompting a call to upgrade Bitcoin now and an invitation to his Token2049 talk at 10:45am on Wed Oct 1, 2025 (source: Charles Edwards X post dated Sep 26, 2025). The post offers no technical evidence for the timeline, but the claim presents headline risk that can affect BTC via narrative-driven volatility and renewed attention to on-chain monitoring of Satoshi-era UTXOs (source: Charles Edwards X post dated Sep 26, 2025). Traders can watch for unusual activity from early addresses, shifts in BTC options implied volatility and skew, and developer signals on post-quantum upgrade discussions as potential catalysts if this narrative gains traction (source: trading analysis based on Charles Edwards X post dated Sep 26, 2025).